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SUBJECT: ELECTION DAY COMMUNITY BASED SECURITY PLAYS ROLE
BUT LESS ROBUST THAN PREVIEWED

REF: KABUL2384

¶1. (SBU) Begin Summary. Community based security (CBS) was an important element on election day, but was not as expansive or as problematic as previewed in advance of the elections. While many provincial leaders noted their intention to tap into local men to provide security, these forces did not materialize in many provinces as a result of a mix of reasons: lack of timely funding by Kabul security agencies, inability to recruit personnel and concerns of provincial leadership about potential misuse of CBS. In some provinces, particularly in the East, the CBS appears to have provided enhanced security on election day, particularly in provinces with more established tribal structures. In the South, the use of CBS was limited with the exception of Uruzgan province, where the CBS was somewhat useful. Herat Province in the West had a much more robust CBS program than was anticipated, but the program fizzled in the North's Ghor Province when provincial leaders realized they would need to be paired with local Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Lack of payment of CBS remains a complaint across the provinces and although payment of 8,000 Afghanis was promised for a month's work, in almost each case, CBS worked only on August 20. End Summary.

RC-North) Limited Role for Community Based Security

¶2. (SBU) In Kunduz, the State PRT Rep reported that about 300 people were deployed as CBS for the election. They were not allocated weapons, so the provincial ANP chief made use of what the ANP had. The CBS was deployed together with the ANP to provide security to the districts, but the ANP Chief told State PRT officer that they were not deployed at polling centers. While the salary was to be 8,000 Afghanis for a month, many have not been paid yet. Unlike in other provinces, the CBS was given a three week training course at the INL Regional Training Center in Kunduz.

¶3. (SBU) In Ghor, despite the intention to make use of CBS on election day as part of the Tribal Security Augmentee Program (TSAP), all security was provided by the ANP without assistance from CBS. The decision to use only ANP stemmed from concerns about implementation of the IEC requirement that a polling site would not open without ANSF being present. Plans to use locals only to secure 100 polling sites were quickly scrapped three days prior to the election and the TSAP was not implemented.

¶4. (SBU) In Faryab, CBS was slated to provide security in about 40 polling stations, including 20 in the Ghormach district, but the IEC limitations on use of local forces without ANSF presence appears to have limited the use of the forces on election day. This particularly impacted the Ghormach district where ANSF were unable to go on election day; reportedly, however, two polling centers in Quaysar district opened on election day with only CBS present. The

PRT indicated that locals reported that the CBS entered some polling places and attempted to influence voting, but it is not clear whether or not this had any impact.

RC-West) Robust CBS in Herat, Nothing in Farah

15. (SBU) While initial plans in Herat were for limited use of CBS in the insecure districts, in the end, CBS was hired in each of Herat's 15 districts. The ANP Chief reported to State PRT Officer that 150 were hired in Shindand and Guzara districts, and 50 were hired in the other 13 districts. Reportedly, though, more than 1000 CBS were hired throughout Herat, so some of the districts had more than the allotted CBS numbers. The ANP Chief said that in some districts CBS was hired as much for political as security reasons, so that residents would not complain they were treated differently. The CBS helped provide outer ring security for polling centers, and did not deploy to the polling centers themselves. The CBS was supposed to be paid the standard 8,000 Afghanis (5000 for salary and 3000 for food, transport, and other expenses) for a month's work; however, funds have only been received for the 350 guards in Shindand, Adraskan, and Guzara. The other 600 plus CBS have not been paid and the local shuras are demanding payment.

16. (SBU) In Farah, the PRT noted that the CBS initiative never materialized because the MOI did not provide funding.

RC-South) Uruzgan Is Exception

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17. (SBU) A Partners Coordination Board Meeting held at the civilian regional platform at RC-South on August 29 concluded that CBS did not play a significant role in providing protection on election day, and to the best of everyone's knowledge, the ANSF were present at all polling centers. Uruzgan was the exception, where a large CBS was deployed, and Helmand Province authorized and paid CBS in some districts, but the CBS does not appear to have been active on election day. Zabul and Kandahar State PRT Representatives reported that CBS was not used on election day.

18. (SBU) In Uruzgan, the PRT estimates roughly 1,000 men from assorted tribal and political affiliations made up the CBS. Each group of men, varying in number, was headed by a commander who reported to an influential tribal and militia leader, Mohammad Nabi Khan Tokhi. The PRT understands that these men stayed between one and two kilometers away from the polls, providing a ring of security around the various polling centers. PRT believes their primary role on election day was to provide directions to those looking for polling centers. Reportedly, the CBS was unarmed, though the PRT were told that if an event occurred they had weapons nearby to assist the ANSF. Team commanders were to be paid \$100 for the month, and foot soldiers were paid about \$20; while not paid as of September 5, the salary money reportedly was transferred to a local bank for payment. While the CBS, as a whole, were well behaved on election day, local officials told the PRT they were not impressed by the CBS and do not plan to incorporate them into the provincial security network on a full-time basis.

19. (SBU) In Helmand, while the CBS was established for a month, their role on election day was minimized after the ANSF and ISAF discouraged its use. The CBS was coordinated at the Provincial level by Deputy Governor Satar, but the district governors controlled their activities. Satar authorized 100 CBS in Gereshk, 100 in Garmsir, 100 in Nad Ali, and 50 in Nawa. PRT reports that despite these authorized positions, CBS played no evident security function on election day.

RC-East) CBS Played Important Role in Some Provinces

¶10. (SBU) In the more tribal or conflicted provinces of RC-East, CBS appeared to play a positive role. However, in some provinces like Bamyan, Kunar, Parwan, Panjshir, and Logar there were no confirmed CBS on election day, although this does not rule out that some informal tribal security was used. Also, in Logar, approximately 250 Anyak copper mine police forces were used for election security in polling centers located in the districts of Mohammad Aga and Pul-e-Alam.

¶11. (SBU) In Laghman, the provincial Chief of Police had instructed all district authorities to hire local tribal militia to support IEC delivery and security of polling centers in their districts. The CoP reportedly promised one bag of wheat to each tribal militia, but never delivered on this promise. A breakdown of district CBS, who were under the command of ANP, is as follows: Qarghai district recruited 230 men to secure 23 polling centers, with most unarmed; Alingar district recruited 130 armed men who were stationed 500 meters from the polling center; Alishang district recruited about 200 armed men; and Dawlat Shah district recruited 720 men to secure 18 polling centers.

¶12. (SBU) In Nuristan, there was not a province-wide CBS program, although Governor Jamlauddin claimed he obtained funds for 150 men at USD100 per month from the MOI. PRT cannot confirm whether he used this money for CBS. PRT reports that district-level CBS worked well in western Nuristan and Alingar (Laghman), and local leaders believe it was the key to successful voting on election day.

¶13. (SBU) In Paktya, CBS played a role at some polling sites on election day but this depended significantly on the particular district. Deputy Governor Mangal assessed the role of the CBS as key in securing the polling centers as he said there were not enough ANSF in the province. Polling centers in Ahmad Aba, Sayed Karam, Mirzaka, and Ahmad Khel reported to the PRT that CBS provided security. Direction of the CBS varied by district, with ANP controlling in some cases and the ANA controlling in others. CBS received 8,000 Afghani for their services, and the tribal elder who recruited the CBS was paid 10,000 Afghani, with the funds coming from the Independent Administration of Highways Protection, according to local leaders. While the PRT cannot confirm all CBS was paid, it notes that the PRT helped

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facilitate travel by Deputy Governor Mangal to Chamkani, where Mangal personally made payments for CBS via regional sub-governors during a shura.

¶14. (SBU) In Nangarhar, the provincial governor tapped into the tribal structure to assist on election day. Tribes provided perimeter security while the ANP secured the immediate area around the polling centers on election day, and tribes also often secured the hills around polling areas to prevent indirect fire attacks; all were under the command of the ANP. District subgovernors and ANP district chiefs met with tribal leaders before the election in each district to assign tasks, roles, and responsibilities. The tribes were not paid a salary, but PRT reports that food and water were provided in some cases by Provincial Council candidates in their areas of strong support as they sought to secure the polls for high voter turn-out.

¶15. (SBU) In Ghazni, there were three different groups of local CBS hired for election day: about 100 women were hired to do security screening of female voters, about 1300 young men were nominated by sub-governors and local shuras; and about 260 elders already serving as guardians of mosques or other significant sites in villages were hired to support security efforts. All were deployed with the ANP at or near polling sites and were under the command of the ANP. CBS was promised 8,000 Afghani (5,000 salary and 3,000 for meals and

expenses) but had not been paid as of September 5. Provincial ANP Chief General Sherzai told the PRT that some members of the CBS structures have come to him to complain about the lack of payment.

¶16. (SBU) In Nangarhar, Governor Sherzai told local security leaders they would receive 1,250,000 Afghanis from the MOI and they selected ten districts for the CBS, with each district governor to be given 120,000 Afghanis to be dispersed among tribal elders. As of September 1, these funds had not been paid to the tribal leaders. The breakdown was as follows: Speen Ghar (100); Achin (60); Nazian (100); Shirzad (120); Khgyani (120); Pachir (100); Dehbala (60); Chaprehar (40); Goshta (40); and Durbaba (40). PRT reports that the provincial government is keen to "institutionalize" these community forces.

¶17. (SBU) In Paktika, CBS played an important security role on election day, with Governor Katawazay giving the CBS high marks. The CBS was made up of 1,800 "trusted volunteers" throughout the province from a list of names submitted to the Governor's office by local elders and tribal leaders. The CBS was commanded by the ANP and present at polling centers across the province. As of September 1, 1,200 of the 1,800 CBS had been paid the allotted 8,000 Afghanis. Governor Katawazay said he would like to explore ways to formally incorporate CBS into ANP structures.

¶18. (SBU) In Wardak, the Afghan Public Protection Program Force (AP3) assisted with local election security under the direction of the ANP. They worked from the districts where they are based in Jalrez, Mayden Shah, Nergh, and northern Sayed Abad. Early talks in Wardak of recruiting additional local forces did not materialize.

Comment

¶19. (SBU) Over-all, the CBS elements on election day played a moderately useful role and appears to have been placed under appropriate command structures with direction by provincial and district level ANP and governors. While there does not appear to have been a one-size fits all approach to recruitment and payment of CBS, the CBS generally were appropriately paired with ANSF at polling sites, with a few reported exceptions, as directed by the IEC policy. With payment of CBS remaining an outstanding issue, recruitment of CBS could be more challenging for future elections if payment issues are not resolved. In those provinces where provincial leadership was concerned about empowering CBS or other tribal elements, they appear to have successfully avoided establishing the program, or side-lining it on election day as was done in Helmand Province. Still, some provincial leaders are keen to explore ways of integrating CBS into formal ANSF structures. Whether this materializes will bear watching, and we will work with appropriate Afghan institutions and coalition military elements to help ensure this evolves appropriately.

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